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DEFINING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE: ARE 
GOVERNMENT PREFERENTIAL BUSINESS CERTIFICATION 
PROGRAMS NARROWLY TAILORED?  
  
George R. La Noue* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The passage of the Public Works Employment Act (“PWEA”) 
of 1976 which set aside ten percent of all procurement dollars awarded 
under it for “minority owned businesses” began a precedent of the use 
of contracting preferences for these firms in various federal programs. 
Later, many of these procurement programs were expanded to include 
women-owned businesses as beneficiaries. Soon such programs were 
initiated by state and local governments across the country.  
Race and gender preferential contracting programs have always 
had an uneasy relationship with equal protection principles. Although 
the PWEA survived a United States Supreme Court decision in 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, in two later landmark decisions, City of Rich-
mond v. Croson and Adarand v. Pena, the Court determined that strict 
scrutiny would be the standard of review for race-based programs. 
Specifically, such programs would need to have a compelling interest 
and be narrowly tailored to survive. Since then, lower courts have 
made several dozen decisions applying these standards. Courts have 
heavily criticized some of these programs for not having a compelling 
interest, but more often where preferential programs have been termi-
nated or altered, it has been because they have not been narrowly tai-
lored. The most common programmatic defect has been including 
groups without evidence of discrimination against them. 
There is another narrow tailoring problem courts have not ad-
dressed. Almost all preferential contracting programs require as a con-
dition of participation that individual firm owners seek certification as 
a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) for federal procurement 
or Minority and Women-Owned Business Enterprise (“MWBE”) for 
state and local procurement. Without such certification, a business 
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cannot receive a preferential contract or be counted in meeting a goal. 
The certification process to determine social and economic disad-
vantage are remarkably uniform across agencies and levels of govern-
ment.  
Three characteristics of the certification process raise narrow 
tailoring problems. First, the social disadvantage affidavit requires on-
ly that the owner affirm that he or she has been “subjected to racial or 
ethnic prejudice or cultural bias.” These phrases do not properly dis-
tinguish between remediable discrimination and societal discrimina-
tion, which the Supreme Court has found is not a basis for a narrow 
tailored remedy.  
Second, there is evidence that while the process for challenging the re-
buttable presumption of social disadvantage exists, the criteria for es-
tablishing that an owner, identified as a member of a designated group, 
now has sufficient achievement and social standing to be no longer so-
cially disadvantaged does not exist. Thus, social disadvantage is as a 
practical matter established at birth and cannot be challenged by evi-
dence of a successful life.  
Third, the economic disadvantage affidavit requires that an 
owner attest that “my ability to compete in the free enterprise system 
has been impaired due to diminished capital or credit opportunities 
compared to other businesses in the same or similar lines of business 
who are not socially or economically disadvantaged.” This attestation 
requires the owner to have accurate information about the capital and 
credit opportunities of the other businesses. The diminished status has 
no time or place limitations. The certification process requires no actu-
al information about the applicant’s credit or borrowing history.  
This Article examines the legal framework for the certification 
process as well as two different sources of empirical evidence. A num-
ber of disparity studies around the nation have asked minority and 
women business owners whether they have suffered from business-
related discrimination. Most owners, in fact, do not claim they have 
suffered from discrimination. The second source of empirical evidence 
is from a telephone survey where certified Maryland MWBEs were 
asked what they thought the concept of social disadvantage meant and 
to describe the incidents of discrimination that had affected them. 
Overwhelmingly, these results show that owner understandings of dis-
advantage and discrimination are inconsistent with the requirement to 
identify relevant discrimination outlined in Croson.  The Article then 
concludes by suggesting some modifications in the certification pro-
cess to make it narrowly tailored.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When governments use racial, ethnic, or gender classifications 
to influence the award of public contracts, which firm owners are enti-
tled to those benefits? Almost everywhere, the answer is firms whose 
owners meet the criteria for certification as Disadvantaged Business 
Enterprises (“DBEs”) in federal programs administered by the Small 
Business Administration (“SBA”), the United States Department of 
Transportation (“USDOT”), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”), and other federal agencies or Minority and Women-Owned 
Business Enterprises (“MWBEs”) in state and local programs. Certifi-
cation is the key to the benefits. When a racial classification is in-
volved, the Supreme Court has held that the standard of review is strict 
scrutiny, which requires the existence of a compelling interest and a 
use of race that is narrowly tailored.
1
 Whether the certification process 
and criteria are narrowly tailored is the subject of this Article.   
In Part I, the Author first briefly reviews characteristics of DBE and 
MWBE programs and the controversies about them. Part II portrays 
the historical context of preferential contracting programs. Part III ex-
amines the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test courts have 
developed to evaluate these programs. In Part IV, the Author describes 
the certification process and criteria for determining economic and so-
cial disadvantage. The social disadvantage presumption in the certifi-
cation process is then compared to evidence from several disparity 
studies in Part V, and to a small sample of Maryland-certified MWBEs 
in Part VI. Finally, Part VII explores some suggestions for modifying 
the certification process. 
Currently there are about 1,425 state and local recipients of 
federal transportation funds, all of whom must set DBE goals on the 
federally subsidized contract they administer.
2
 About 27,000 firms are 
certified as DBEs,
3
 and there are also about 8,440 8(a) certified firms
4
 
                                                          
1
 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (plurali-
ty opinion). 
2
 Email from Leonardo San Román, Spec. Assistant to the Dir., Off. of Small 
& Disadvantage Bus. Utilization, to John Sullivan, Assoc. Director, Project on Civil 
Rights & Public Contracts (Sept. 27, 2011) (on file with author). 
3
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-78, DISADVANTAGED 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAMS:  ASSESSING USE OF PROXY DATA WOULD 
ENHANCE ABILITY TO KNOW IF STATES ARE MEETING THEIR GOALS 8 (2011).   
4
 The Small Business Administration allows small businesses that are owned 
and controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual to apply for 
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eligible for federal prime contracts set aside for them.
5
 There is no ac-
curate count of state and local MWBE programs or the number of 
MWBE certified firms, but they are common in areas with large mi-
nority populations.
6
 
  Race and gender preferential contracting programs have al-
ways had an uneasy relationship with equal protection principles. Alt-
hough a federal minority business program survived a United States 
Supreme Court decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
7
 in two later land-
mark decisions, City of Richmond v. Croson
8
 and Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena,
9
 the Court adopted the strict scrutiny standard for 
race-based contracting programs at any level of government. Specifi-
cally, such programs would need to have a compelling interest and be 
narrowly tailored to survive.
10
  
Since then, lower courts have made several dozen decisions 
applying these standards with mixed results. With the exception of the 
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
in Rothe v. Department of Defense,
11
 courts have generally decided 
federal preferential contracting programs have a compelling interest.
12
 
In W. States Paving Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp.,13 how-
ever, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found 
                                                                                                                                         
an 8(a) certification program. 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2012). “The purpose of the 8(a) BD 
program is to assist eligible small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the 
American economy through business development.” Id. These businesses must 
demonstrate a “potential for success” and must be “unconditionally owned and con-
trolled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are 
of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States.” 13 C.F.R. § 
124.101 (2012).  
5
 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 
AND FY 2010 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 77 (2012).    
6
See Certification Overview, MWBE.COM, 
http://www.mwbe.com/cert/certification.htm (last visited October 14, 2012). 
7
 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
8
 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
9
 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
10
 Id. at 237. 
11
 Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 545 F.3d 1023, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
12
 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969 (8th 
Cir. 2003); N. Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2007).   
13
 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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that the state’s implementation of a federal program was not narrowly 
tailored.
14
  
State and local funded preferential contracting programs have 
fared worse under judicial scrutiny.
15
 Following Croson, it has been 
generally established that without a disparity study identifying con-
tracting discrimination in a local market, thus creating a compelling 
interest, procurement programs that give advantages to businesses on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.
16
 Courts,
17
 federal agencies
18
 and scholars
19
 have heavily criti-
cized many of these studies as flawed grounds for establishing a com-
pelling interest. More often, however, where preferential programs 
have been terminated or altered by courts, it has been because they 
have not been narrowly tailored.
20
  
                                                          
14
 See id. at 1003 (holding that the State of Washington failed to meet its bur-
den of proving that its DBE program is “narrowly tailored to further Congress’s 
compelling remedial interest”). 
15
 Post-Croson courts have found serious flaws in the statistical evidence of 
discrimination presented to them.  See O’Donnell Constr. Co., v. District of Colum-
bia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of 
Phila., 91 F.3d. 586, 610 (3rd Cir. 1996); Phillips & Jordan, Inc. v. Watts, 13 F. 
Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (N.D. Fla. 1998); Webster v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 51 F. Supp. 2d 
1354, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff’d, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000); Assoc. Util. 
Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 83 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622 (D. Md. 2000); 
Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, Colo., 36 F.3d 1513, 1530–31 (10th 
Cir. 1994); Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th 
Cir. 2001); Hershell Gill Consulting Eng’r, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 333 F. Supp. 
2d 1305, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2004); L. Tarango Trucking v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 181 
F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2001). On the other hand, a few courts have been 
more favorably disposed toward disparity studies. See Concrete Works of Colorado, 
Inc. v. City of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 994 (10th Cir. 2003); N. Contracting, Inc. v. 
Ill., 473 F.3d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 2007).    
16
 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DISPARITY STUDIES AS EVIDENCE OF 
DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL CONTRACTING 2 (2006). 
17
 See Phillips & Jordan, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (criticizing the use of census 
data in a disparity study for an overinclusive measure of availability) or Associated 
Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 50 F. Supp. 2d 741, 747 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (criti-
cizing the overstatement of the percentage of qualified MBEs that can provide public 
services).   
18
 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 25 (2006).  
19
 See generally Stephen E. Celec, Dan Voich, Jr., E. Joe Nosari & Melvin T. 
Stith, Sr., Measuring Disparity in Government Procurement: Problems with Using 
Census Data Estimating Availability, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 134 (2000); George R. 
La Noue, Who Counts?Measuring the Availability of Minority Businesses for Public 
Contracting after Croson, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 793 (1998).   
20
  See, e.g., W. States Paving Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 407 
F.3d 983, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Consequently, examining whether the certification process on which 
all federal, state, and local race and gender preferential contracting 
programs are based is narrowly tailored is a significant issue. 
 
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PREFERENTIAL CONTRACTING 
PROGRAMS 
 
The passage of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 
(“PWEA”),21 which set aside ten percent of all procurement dollars 
awarded under the Act for “minority owned businesses,” began a leg-
islative precedent of using contracting preferences for these firms in 
various federal programs.  The next year Congress passed Amend-
ments to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, which gave leg-
islative approval to an earlier administrative practice of setting aside 
8(a) contracts for “socially or economically disadvantaged individu-
als.”22 The SBA had determined that Blacks, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans were presumptively socially disadvantaged.
23
 Later, many 
of these preferential procurement programs were expanded to include 
other minority and women-owned businesses as beneficiaries.
24
 Soon, 
state and local governments across the country initiated such pro-
grams.  
 As is true of most public programs, there were many motiva-
tions for what initially were called minority business enterprise 
(“MBE”) programs: 
            
(1) To remedy instances of current discrimination against spe-
cific minority businesses.
25
 
 
(2) To overcome the present effects of past discrimination 
against minority businesses.
26
 
                                                          
21
 Pub. L. No. 95-28 (91 Stat. 116).  
22
 Pub. L. No. 95-507 (92 Stat. 1757) (1978).    
23
 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(a)(1) (2012). 
24
 Elizabeth Newell, Administration Takes First Crack at Controversial Wom-
en’s Procurement Program, GOV’T. EXEC., (Mar. 2, 2010), 
http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2010/03/administration-takes-first-crack-at-
controversial-womens-procurement-program/30964/. 
25
 MD. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF MINORITY AFFAIRS, STATE OF MARYLAND 
MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (MBE) PROGRAM SUBGOAL DIRECTIVE AND 
GUIDELINES FOR SETTING CONTRACT SUBGOALS 1 (2011), available at  
http://www.mdminoritybusiness.org/documents/SubgoalGuidanceImplementationGu
idelinesFinal-website_000.pdf.   
26
 Id.  
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(3) To compensate for societal discrimination against some 
groups.
27
 
 
(4) To create new economic strength in the minority communi-
ties.
28
 
   
 (5) To create more business competition.
29
 
 
(6) To respond to the political demands of particular individu-
als or groups to reallocate public contracts.
30
 
 
(7) To create new political coalitions to overturn the existing 
commercial and political establishment. 
31
 
  
 The PWEA identified the preferred minority groups as Black, 
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimos, or Aleuts.
32
 Over time, 
however, the SBA, which administered the 8(a) program setting aside 
                                                          
27
 Id.  
28
 Timothy Bates & Darrell Williams, Racial Politics: Does it Pay?, 74 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 507, 507 (1993) (discussing how MBE programs expanded the number and 
revenues of black businesses in cities with black mayors).  
29
 Minority Business Development Agency, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, OFF. OF 
GEN. COUNS., Minority Business Development Agency, 
http://www.commerce.gov/os/ogc/minority-business-development-agency (last visit-
ed Oct. 7, 2012).   
30
 In a 1995 study, Bates and Williams also found that black businesses expe-
rienced an increase in sales and growth in cities run by black mayors who supported 
an MBE program. Timothy Bates & Darrell Williams, Preferential Procurement 
Programs and Minority-Owned Businesses, 17 J. URB. AFF. 227, 227–42 (1995).  On 
the other hand, in a 1996 study, they found that MBE programs that heavily relied on 
government contracts, were more likely to go out of business than comparable firms. 
Timothy Bates & Darrell Williams, Do Preferential Procurement Programs Benefit 
Minority Business?, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 294, 294 (1996).  In a 1998 study, Kenneth 
Chay and Robert Fairlie found that in the pre-Croson period, MBE set aside pro-
grams increased black self-employment. Kenneth Y. Chay & Robert W. Fairlie, Mi-
nority Business Set-Asides and Black Self-Employment (December 1998) (un-
published manuscript), available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=2&c
ad=rja&ved=0CCcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fciteseerx.ist.psu.edu%2Fviewdoc
%2Fdownload%3Fdoi%3D10.1.1.196.9952%26rep%3Drep1%26type%3Dpdf&ei=y
Tp7UM6DJouy0QHk3oH4Ag&usg=AFQjCNHCuWsHWTHORQf_beIYkg9JHNID
Q.    
31
 GEORGE R. LA NOUE, LOCAL OFFICIALS GUIDE TO MINORITY BUSINESS 
PROGRAMS AND DISPARITY STUDIES 6–7 (1994). 
32
 Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2006). 
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federal contracts, formalized a modified definition of recognized mi-
norities.
33
 Spanish-speaking became Hispanic, since many Hispanics 
do not actually use Spanish to communicate.
34
 Oriental, which was 
considered a pejorative term, was expanded to include non-white 
Asian nationalities beyond the Far Eastern geographical area.
35
  Cur-
rently, all DBE and most MWBE programs use the same definition of 
designated minority groups. The preferred racial and ethnic groups are:  
Black Americans; Hispanic Americans; Native Americans (Alaska Na-
tives, Native Hawaiians, or enrolled members of a Federally or State 
recognized Indian Tribe); Asian Pacific Americans (persons with ori-
gins from Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, 
Japan, China (including Hong Kong), Taiwan, Laos, Cambodia (Kam-
puchea), Vietnam, Korea, The Philippines, U.S. Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands (Republic of Palau), Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Guam, Samoa, Macao, Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
or Nauru); Subcontinent Asian Americans (persons with origins from 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives Islands 
or Nepal).
36
 
 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE NARROW TAILORING OF PREFERENTIAL 
CONTRACTING PROGRAMS 
 
 The ten percent set-aside in the PWEA was almost immediate-
ly challenged, resulting in the Supreme Court decision in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick.
37
 There were five separate opinions in the case, though the 
majority mustered six votes to approve the program.
38
 There were dif-
ferent theories about why the minority set-aside should be upheld. 
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Powell, thought the 
                                                          
33
 For a description of the SBA administrative process and its decisions about 
which groups were considered socially disadvantaged, see generally George La 
Noue and John C. Sullivan, Presumptions for Preferences: The Small Business Ad-
ministration’s Decisions on Groups Entitled to Affirmative Action, 6 J. POL’Y HIST. 
439 (1994).  For a more detailed history of the SBA and the 8(a) program, see gener-
ally JONATHAN J. BEAN, BIG GOVERNMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE 
SCANDALOUS HISTORY OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (2001).  
34
 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2006) with 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2012). 
35
 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2006) with 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2012).  
36
 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2012). 
37
 See 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
38
 Id. at 492. 
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purpose of the act was within the Congressional spending power
39
 and 
that limited use of race and ethnic criteria on its face did not violate 
equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
40
 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Powell thought the 
government needed to make some findings of previous illegal discrim-
ination and that Congress had reasonably done so.
41
 Justice Marshall 
asked only if the set-asides were “substantially related” to a remedial 
purpose.
42
 In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, ar-
gued that the set-aside provisions were illegally intended to create ra-
cial balance in the award of public works contracts and were also 
aimed at compensating for social, educational, and economic disad-
vantage, which were not a monopoly of any race.
43
 Justice Stevens 
added in dissent that as Congress had not made the proper findings and 
that as a remedy, the set-asides were overbroad.
44
    
 In City of Richmond v. Croson, the Supreme Court confronted 
for the first time one of the local limitations of federal preferential con-
tracting programs.
45
 Richmond had created a program requiring that at 
least 30% of local construction dollars go to minority businesses.
46
 Af-
ter suggesting important differences between federal and local authori-
ty, the Court rejected Richmond’s arguments and evidence to justify 
its program.
47
  
 While accepting narrowly tailored race conscious remedial 
programs in the “extreme case,”48 the Croson court also announced a 
number of restrictions on them.
49
 Perhaps the most important require-
ment was that the discrimination had to be carefully identified
50
 and 
                                                          
39
 Id. at 475 (plurality opinion). See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 1 (“The 
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,  imposts and excises, to 
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United 
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.”). 
40
 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482–83 (plurality opinion). 
41
 Id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring).   
42
 Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
43
 Id. at 529–30 (Stewart J., dissenting). 
44
 Id. at 552–54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
45
 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
46
 Id. at 477. 
47
 Id. at 508. 
48
 Id. at 509. 
49
 See id. at 498–99 (plurality opinion). 
50
 Id. at 497 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) 
(plurality opinion)) (noting the difference between societal and identified discrimina-
tion). See also id. at 499 (assertions about discrimination in an entire industry are in-
adequate); id. (“It is sheer speculation how many minority firms there would be in 
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would require “searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such 
race-based measures.”51 As Justice O’Connor wrote in a plurality opin-
ion: “Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the 
scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its 
effects.”52 These findings had to go beyond assertions of societal dis-
crimination, because it “without more, is too amorphous a basis for 
imposing a racially classified remedy.”53 Among the proper findings 
for a narrowly tailored MBE
54
 program, the evidence had to focus in 
the local market place and could not rely on national data.
55
 Croson al-
so insisted that the finding of discrimination be specific to a particular 
industry, because “a generalized assertion that there has been past dis-
crimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative 
body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.”56 
 Croson also stands for the proposition that preferential pro-
grams must have justification for each major group receiving them.
57
 
Most state and local MWBE programs followed the federal definition 
of “minority groups” without any modification for local conditions. 
But Justice O’Connor noted the city had no evidence of “past discrim-
ination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 
persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry,” includ-
ing whether Richmond ever had any Eskimo or Aleut citizens.
58
 Final-
                                                                                                                                         
Richmond absent societal discrimination.”); id. at 507 (“[I]t is almost impossible to 
assess whether the Richmond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimina-
tion since it is not linked to identified discrimination in any way.”). 
51
 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion). 
52
 Id. at 510. 
53
 Id. at 497 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276) (plurality opinion). 
54
 Richmond’s program should be properly called an MBE rather than MWBE 
program because women were not included in the beneficiary groups. See id. at 477–
78.   
55
 Id. at 504 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 487 (1980)) (“Con-
gress explicitly recognized that the scope of the problem would vary from market 
area to market area.”).  See id. at 500 (finding that statements about discrimination in 
the Pittsburgh construction industry have “little probative value in establishing iden-
tified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry”). 
56
 Croson, 488 U.S. at 498. 
57
 See id. at 506. 
58
 Id. (“The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may 
never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond, 
suggests that perhaps the city’s purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimina-
tion.”). This principle has had a major impact on lower courts reviewing MWBE 
programs. For example, the recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in Rowe v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., stripped women, Hispanics, and 
Asians from the state’s MWBE program because of the lack of evidence in the 
state’s disparity study to support their inclusion. 615 F.3d 233, 259 (4th Cir. 2010).  
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ly, Justice O’Connor noted that many of the barriers impacting minori-
ty owned firms appeared to be race neutral, but that “there does not 
appear to have been any consideration of the use of race neutral means 
to increase minority business participation in city contracting.”59  
 While the plurality did not require any particular limitation to 
Congressional authority to use racial preferences in federal contracting 
in Fullilove,
60
 fifteen years later the Court confronted the issue of 
whether the strict scrutiny standards developed in Croson for state and 
local MWBE programs should also apply to federal preferential con-
tracting programs in Adarand v. Pena.
61
 The Court found that there 
should be a single standard of strict scrutiny applied to all governmen-
tal programs based on racial classifications, which means that DBE 
and other federal contracting programs must have a compelling inter-
est and be narrowly tailored.
62
 While courts have given extensive 
guidance on a number of narrow tailoring issues (as discussed above), 
they have only indirectly addressed the narrow tailoring implication of 
the blanket presumption in the certification process that all minority 
and women business owners are socially disadvantaged. For example, 
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, dissenting Justices were concerned not only 
with the Congressional decision about which groups were eligible for 
the ten percent set-aside contracts,
63
 but also which particular firms 
were to be eligible for those contracts. Justice Stewart argued, “In to-
day’s society, it constitutes far too gross of an oversimplification to as-
sume that every single Negro, Spanish-speaking citizen, Oriental, In-
dian, Eskimo and Aleut potentially interested in construction 
contracting currently suffers from the effects of past or present racial 
discrimination.”64   
 Justice Stevens made a similar point:   
  
 
                                                                                                                                         
See also W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 1002-
03; Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 713 (9th Cir. 1997); Builders 
Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2001), Associat-
ed Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 736 (6
th
 Cir. 2000); O’Donnell 
Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
59
 Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. 
60
 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980). 
61
 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  
62
 Id.  
63
 Justice Stevens complained in his Fullilove dissent that there was not a sin-
gle word in the Act or its legislative history about why the particular groups in 
PWEA were selected as beneficiaries. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 535–36. 
64
 Id. at 530 n.12 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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Assuming, however, that some firms have been 
denied public business for racial reasons, the in-
stant statutory remedy [PWEA] is nevertheless 
demonstrably much broader than is necessary to 
right any such past wrong. For the statute grants 
the special preference to a class that includes 
(1) those minority-owned firms that have suc-
cessfully obtained business in the past on a free 
competitive basis and undoubtedly are capable 
of doing so in the future as well, (2) firms that 
have never attempted to obtain any public busi-
ness in the past, (3) firms that were initially 
formed after the Act was passed, including 
those that may have been organized simply to 
take advantage of its provisions, (4) firms that 
have tried to obtain public business but were 
unsuccessful for reasons that are unrelated to 
the racial characteristics of their stockholders, 
and (5) those firms that have been victimized by 
racial discrimination.
65
 
 
 The Court was presented with no empirical evidence about the 
distribution of minority firms in these categories, but Justice Stevens 
concluded: “In any event, since it is highly unlikely that the composi-
tion of the fifth category is at all representative of the entire class of 
firms to which the statute grants a valuable preference, it is ill-fitting 
to characterize this as a narrowly tailored remedial measure.”66   
 Croson clarified the standard of review for racial classification 
as strict scrutiny, moving the concern for narrowly tailoring the bene-
ficiaries of a remedial race-based contracting program from a dissent 
position to that of a plurality opinion.
67
 Though unconvinced that the 
evidence Richmond proffered created a compelling interest for its quo-
ta program, Justice O’Connor was clear that some remedies were ap-
propriate where contracting discrimination was identified.
68
 If system-
atic exclusion of minority subcontractors by non-minority prime 
contractors could be proven, then in the “extreme case,” a narrowly 
tailored preference to break down patterns of “deliberate exclusion” 
                                                          
65
 Id. at 540–41 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
66
 Id. at 541 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67
 488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989).  
68
 Id. at 492 (plurality opinion). 
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could be employed.
69
 If there were individual instances of a racially 
motivated refusal to employ minority subcontractors, “a city would be 
justified in penalizing the discriminator and providing appropriate re-
lief to the victim of such discrimination.”70 
 Once contracting discrimination had been identified, how 
should the beneficiaries of the appropriate remedy be determined? Jus-
tice O’Connor faulted Richmond for not inquiring into “whether or not 
the particular MBE seeking a racial preference has suffered from the 
effects of past discrimination by the city or prime contractors.”71 She 
suggested that failure was caused by “simple administrative conven-
ience.”72 However, the Court held, “[T]he interest in avoiding the bu-
reaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who truly 
have suffered the effects of prior discrimination cannot justify a rigid 
line drawn on the basis of a suspect classification.”73 
The Croson Court did not specifically raise issues about the 
MBE certification process,
74
 but its language suggests that a presump-
tion that all members of a group were victims of societal or contracting 
discrimination in a certification process would not be justifiable.  
In the majority opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, Justice 
O’Connor returned to the question about whether the Constitution re-
quires individualized proof of social or economic disadvantage and 
what kind of proof is sufficient.
75
 Her opinion raised questions about 
certification in a number of programs:  
 
[U]nresolved questions remain concerning the 
details of the complex regulatory regimes im-
plicated by the use of subcontractor compensa-
tion clauses. For example, the SBA's 8(a) pro-
gram requires an individualized inquiry into the 
economic disadvantage of every participant, see 
13 CFR § 124.106(a) (1994), whereas the 
DOT's regulations implementing STURAA § 
106(c) do not require certifying authorities to 
make such individualized inquiries, see 49 CFR 
                                                          
69
 Id. at 509. 
70
 Id.  
71
 Id. at 508. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. (criticizing administrative convenience as a defense where constitutional 
rights are involved). 
74
 See generally id. 
75
 515 U.S. 200, 208 (1995).  
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§ 23.62 (1994); 49 CFR pt. 23, subpt. D, App. 
C (1994). And the regulations seem unclear as 
to whether 8(d) subcontractors must make indi-
vidualized showings, or instead whether the 
race-based presumption applies both to social 
and economic disadvantage, compare 13 CFR § 
124.106(b) (1994) (apparently requiring 8(d) 
participants to make an individualized show-
ing), with 48 CFR § 19.703(a)(2) (1994) (ap-
parently allowing 8(d) subcontractors to invoke 
the race-based presumption for social and eco-
nomic disadvantage). See generally Part I, su-
pra. We also note an apparent discrepancy be-
tween the definitions of which socially 
disadvantaged individuals qualify as economi-
cally disadvantaged for the 8(a) and 8(d) pro-
grams; the former requires a showing that such 
individuals' ability to compete has been im-
paired "as compared to others in the same or 
similar line of business who are not socially 
disadvantaged," 13 CFR § 124.106(a)(1)(i) 
(1994) (emphasis added), while the latter re-
quires that showing only "as compared to others 
in the same or similar line of business," § 
124.106(b)(1). The question whether any of the 
ways in which the Government uses subcon-
tractor compensation clauses can survive strict 
scrutiny, and any relevance distinctions such as 
these may have to that question, should be ad-
dressed in the first instance by the lower 
courts.
76
 
 
 Justice O’Connor did not purport to settle these questions about 
certification, since the record before the Court did not permit it, but 
she was clearly insisting that the question of individualized finding for 
beneficiaries of a race-based program was a legitimate subject for ju-
dicial review.  
 What followed was quite unpredictable. On remand, the district 
court found that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause (“SCC”), the 
provision that awarded a bonus to prime contractors for using minority 
                                                          
76
 Id. at 238–39 (emphasis in original). 
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subcontractors, and the presumption of social and economic disad-
vantage used in the certification process were not narrowly tailored.
77
 
The court reviewed the various preferential contracting that used the 
presumption and held:   
 
The statutes and regulations governing the SCC 
program are overinclusive in that they presume 
that all those in the named minority group 
members are economically and, in some acts 
and regulations, socially disadvantaged. This 
presumption is flawed, as is its corollary, name-
ly that the majority (caucasians) as well as 
members of other (unlisted) minority groups are 
not socially and or/ economically disadvan-
taged. By excluding certain minority groups 
whose members are economically and socially 
disadvantaged due to past and present discrimi-
nation, the SCC program is underinclusive.
78
   
 
 Adarand then filed suit against Colorado state officials, arguing 
that its administration of the federal highway DBE program was also 
unconstitutional.
79
 In the face of this challenge, Colorado changed its 
DBE certification guidelines by eliminating the presumption of social 
and economic disadvantage for minorities and opening up certification 
to anyone who affirmed he was socially disadvantaged.
80
 The district 
court hearing the case against the state program reasoned that the SCC 
program and its racial presumptions made Adarand’s owner, Randy 
Pech, socially disadvantaged as a white male, and therefore he had a 
remedy of becoming a DBE himself.
81
 On appeal, however, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated on the grounds 
that Pech, now a DBE, no longer had standing.
82
 Pech then sought re-
view by the Supreme Court, and there found a more sympathetic audi-
                                                          
77
 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1570 (D. Colo. 
1997), vacated sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292 (10th 
Cir. 1999) cert. granted 528 U.S. 216 (2000), and rev'd. Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000). 
78
 Adarand Constructors, Inc., 965 F. Supp. at 1580. 
79
 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Romer, 174 F.R.D. 100, 101–02 (D. Colo. 
1997). 
80
 Adarand Constructors, Inc. 169 F.3d at 1296. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. at 1296–97. 
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ence.
83
 Once again Adarand was before the Supreme Court, and the 
Tenth Circuit’s opinion was again reversed.84  
 The certification issue was not raised in subsequent litigation, 
however, until it came into judicial purview in a challenge to the state 
administration of a DBE program. In W. States Paving Co., the Wash-
ington State Department of Transportation, lacking a completed dis-
parity study, tried to argue that its collection of sworn DBE certifica-
tion affidavits constituted appropriate evidence of discrimination.
 85
 
The Ninth Circuit was not impressed and responded: 
 
[E]ven if we were to consider these affidavits, 
they do not provide any evidence of discrimina-
tion within Washington's transportation con-
tracting industry. Notwithstanding the State's 
express representation to the contrary during 
oral argument, these affidavits do not require 
prospective DBEs to certify that they have been 
victims of discrimination in the contracting in-
dustry. Rather, as mandated by the federal regu-
lations, the owner of a firm applying for DBE 
status need only attest to having been subjected 
to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias, or 
having suffered the effects of discrimination, 
because of his identity as a member of one or 
more minority groups, without regard to his in-
dividual qualities. Such claims of general socie-
tal discrimination--and even generalized asser-
tions about discrimination in an entire industry-
-cannot be used to justify race-conscious reme-
dial measures.
86
  
 
                                                          
83
 Adarand Constructors, Inc., 528 U.S. at, 223–24 (per curiam). 
84
 Id. at 224 (per curiam). 
85
 W. States Paving Co. v. Washington State Dep’t of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 
1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005). 
86
 Id. at 1002 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996) ("[A]n effort to alle-
viate the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest."); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("Societal dis-
crimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified 
remedy."). 
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While the thrust of the court’s dicta was that the certification 
affidavits were not appropriate to establish the necessary predicate for 
Washington state’s administration of a DBE program, its language can 
also be read to imply that such affidavits are too broad to sustain a 
finding that any individual owner is entitled to benefit from a race con-
scious remedial measure.
87
 As the court noted, attesting to being a vic-
tim of societal discrimination is not a narrowly tailored predicate for 
such an individual remedy.
88
   
 Although all of these opinions suggest the certification process 
and its criteria are legitimate subjects for judicial review, none of them 
constitute an in-depth analysis of that process or contain a definitive 
judicial pronouncement about whether it is narrowly tailored. 
 
IV. CERTIFICATION OF PROCESS 
 
While courts have frequently addressed the narrow tailoring is-
sue of whether the groups preferred in DBE and MWBE programs 
were overinclusive,
89
 the narrowly tailoring problems in the certifica-
tion process and criteria have not been fully examined. Almost all 
preferential contracting programs require as a condition of participa-
tion that individual firm owners seek certification as a DBE or 8(a) 
firm for federal procurement or as a MWBE for state and local pro-
curement.
90
 Without such certification a business cannot receive a set-
aside contract or be counted in meeting a subcontracting goal set by 
the jurisdiction.      
The need for contemporary certification processes is a legacy 
of the federal government’s response to the Adarand decision, but the 
criteria and language used in them go back to earlier decisions made 
by the SBA.
91
 Recognizing after Adarand that both the compelling in-
terest and narrow tailoring prongs of strict scrutiny would now be ap-
plied to federal contracting programs using racial classifications, the 
Clinton administration, following the President’s “Mend Don’t End” 
philosophy, moved to shore up the compelling interest for such pro-
grams and to narrowly tailor their administration.
92
 
                                                          
87
 See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 1002.  
88
 Id. 
89
 See generally supra note 58.  
90
 See 49 C.F.R. § 26.83 (2012). 
91
 See BEAN, supra note 33, at 102. 
92
 Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of 
Transportation Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 5096 (Feb. 2, 1999). See U. S. COMM’N ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 34–46 (2006).  
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The focus of this effort was the various transportation subsidy 
programs, which like the PWEA, had required that ten percent of the 
dollars spent had to go to MBEs. The Department of Commerce com-
missioned a disparity study, but it showed very mixed patterns of un-
der and over utilization depending on the type of construction industry 
and the regions of the country.
93
 The Department of Justice contracted 
with the Urban Institute to do a meta-study of existing state and local 
disparity studies, but meta-studies depend on the validity of the origi-
nal studies.
94
 Many of those studies used methodologies that were later 
invalidated in litigation.
95
 The Department of Justice also produced 
Appendix A to “Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action Federal Pro-
curement,” which was a compendium of existing disparity studies and 
other research to buttress its position that a compelling interest exist-
ed.
96
 
In narrowly tailoring the administration of the federal transpor-
tation program, it was decided that a national ten percent quota was no 
longer defensible. Consequently, it was left to state and local recipients 
of federal transportation dollars to determine the size of their DBE 
goals according to their determination of the level of DBE participa-
tion that would be expected absent discrimination in their marketplac-
es.
97
 Sometimes that resulted in DBE goals lower than ten percent, 
sometimes much higher.
98
  
One narrow tailoring change that was not made was to re-
examine the particular racial and ethnic groups eligible for the pre-
sumption of social and economic disadvantage.
99
 These groups have 
essentially remained the same since the enactment of the PWEA.  
                                                          
93
 Small Disadvantaged Business Procurement: Reform of Affirmative Action 
in Federal Procurement, 63 Fed. Reg. 71724, 71724 (Dec. 29, 1998).  
94
 See U. S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 35. 
95
 See id. at 39–40 n. 52.   
96
 Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 26042, 26051–63  (May 23, 1996).   
97
 49 C.F.R. § 26.45(b) (2012). 
98
 For a report on the process and outcomes of post-Adarand DBE goal setting 
in all fifty states, see George R. La Noue, Setting Goals in the Federal Disadvan-
taged Business Enterprise Program, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 423, 443–51  
(2006). For a discussion of the process and outcomes of post-Adarand DBE goals 
setting in airports, see generally George R. La Noue, Follow the Money: Who Bene-
fits From the Federal Aviation Administration’s DBE Program?, 38 AM. REV. PUB. 
ADMIN. 480 (2008). 
99
 See generally George R. La Noue & John Sullivan, Gross Presumptions: 
Determining Group Eligibility for Federal Procurement Preferences, 41 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 103 (2000). 
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There were, however, some narrow tailoring changes in the DBE certi-
fication process in the articulation of the concepts of social and eco-
nomic disadvantage. Since many state and local governments partici-
pate in or follow the standards of the Uniform Certification 
Program,
100
 the effect of the federal DBE changes was also to restruc-
ture simultaneously state and local MWBE certification procedures. 
Since one set of state and local administrators manage both the DBE 
and MWBE certification process, it is obviously more administratively 
efficient for them and firms seeking certification to use common crite-
ria and forms. 
Certification plans are based on social and economic considera-
tions, which purport to demonstrate disadvantage. Any person who 
owns fifty-one percent of a business and identifies with one of the des-
ignated minority groups or who is a woman is “presumed” to be so-
cially and economically disadvantaged.
101
 These concepts were bor-
rowed from earlier decisions by the SBA in administering its 8(a) 
program.
102
 In the certification process, however, the two prongs are 
treated differently.  
 
A. Proving Economic Disadvantage 
 
During the post-Adarand Congressional debate on the DBE 
program, opponents hammered away at the idea that very wealthy 
people could own a DBE.
103
 Consequently, proponents argued that the 
proposed new DBE regulations would restrict DBE owners to persons 
who were “economically disadvantaged” because of the low size of 
their net worth and because their businesses were considered small 
businesses according to the standards set by the SBA.
104
 In determin-
ing the limits of a DBE’s applicant’s net worth, the USDOT also bor-
                                                          
100
 See 49 C.F.R, § 26.81 (1997) (describing the Unified Certification Pro-
gram).  The Uniform process is required to be used by all recipients of federal funds. 
Id. § 26.81(a). It may operate jointly in two or more states, and firms certified in one 
state may be automatically certified in another state. Id. § 26.81(e).    
101
 49 C.F.R § 26.67 (2012). 
102
 BEAN, supra note 33, at 102. 
103
 Id. at 103. 
104
 SBA was driven to set an objective limit to defining economic disadvantage 
because, as SBA administrator Vernon Weaver recalled in an earlier period, “‘It 
boils down to a judgment call . . . . I must have spent a couple of hundred hours with 
my general counsel . . . discussing: What the hell is ‘economic disadvantage?” Id. 
102–03. 
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rowed SBA criteria from the 8(a) minority set-aside program.
105
 A 
DBE owner’s net worth had to be below $750,000, excluding the value 
of the owner’s principal residence and the value of the owner’s busi-
ness.
106
 Not only do DBE applicants have to swear in affidavits that 
they meet those criteria, they must also submit to personal interviews 
and provide detailed documents to verify those facts.
107
 Certification 
authorities then carefully monitor the documentation about economic 
disadvantage in the certification application. 
Narrow tailoring questions still can be raised about the defini-
tion of economic disadvantage, particularly since the definition of net 
worth limit was raised in January 2011 to $1.32 million.
108
 To put that 
federally determined cutoff into context, according to the 2010 census, 
the national average household net worth, excluding the equity in a 
home and a business, was $46,740.
109
  
There is another narrow tailoring issue. The economic disad-
vantaged section of the affidavit, apparently realizing that creating an 
abstract dollar definition of economic disadvantage would include 
many whites males, requires DBE applicants to attribute their “low” 
net worth because their “ability to compete in the free enterprise sys-
tem has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportuni-
ties as compared to others in the same or similar line of business who 
are not socially disadvantaged.”110 Statements in the affidavit are made 
and executed under oath and the penalty of perjury. Just how a person 
                                                          
105
 See Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of 
Transportation Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 5096, 5098 (Feb. 2, 1999). 
106
 Id. In 1995, Phillip Lader, SBA Administrator, testified that, even by using 
family net worth, rather than individual net worth, more than 91% of all business 
owners would have been considered economically disadvantaged because they were 
below the $750,000 limit. The Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Minority Busi-
ness Development Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus., 104th 
Cong. 14–29 (1995) (statement of Philip Lader, Adm’r of the U.S. Small Bus. Ad-
min.). 
107
 See e.g., 49 C.F.R § 26.67(b)(3) (2012). 
108
 Disadvantaged Business Enterprise: Program Improvements, 76 Fed. Reg. 
5098, 5099 (Jan. 28, 2011). In some state and local MWBE programs, the owner net 
worth limits are higher. In the New York state program, for example, the economi-
cally disadvantage limit is $3,500,000. DIV. OF MINORITY & WOMEN BUS. DEV., 
EMPIRE STATE DEV., ATTACHMENT A: NYS MWBE CERTIFICATION INDIVIDUAL 
PERSONAL NET WORTH AFFIDAVIT. The recently enacted Milwaukee MWBE pro-
gram had no owner net worth limitations at all. See MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE 
ORDINANCES ch. 370 (2012).   
109
 See Wealth and Asset Ownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).   
110
 49 C.F.R § 26 App. E (2012).  
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is able to swear under oath that they have the breadth of information 
about the capital and credit of their competitors is uncertain. Does the 
term “others” mean most or some competitors? If a person had not ex-
perienced difficulty in raising money for a business, could he honestly 
sign the economic disadvantage affidavit? Though it would be possible 
for certification authorities to require evidence that a firm had tried 
and failed to receive credit or a loan, applicants who are presumed 
economically disadvantaged are not asked to supply that infor-
mation.
111
  
 
B. Asserting Social Disadvantage 
 
This Article is more focused on whether the definition of social 
disadvantage is narrowly tailored, because if a person is not classified 
as socially disadvantaged, their economic status is irrelevant. Social 
disadvantage in DBE programs and most often in MWBE programs is 
established in a two-step process. First, a minority or female owner 
checks a box indicating group identification in one of the designated 
groups: Female, Black American, Asian-Pacific American, Hispanic 
American, Native American, Sub-Continent Asian-American, or Oth-
er.
112
 Second, such a person then signs a one-sentence affidavit claim-
ing: 
I certify that I am socially disadvantaged be-
cause I have been subjected to racial or ethnic 
prejudice or cultural bias, or have suffered the 
effects of discrimination, because of my identity 
as a member of one or more of the groups iden-
tified above, without regard to my individual 
qualities.
113
  
 
Since members of such groups are presumed to be socially dis-
advantaged, certification authorities ask for no proof of an applicant’s 
                                                          
111
 See generally DIV. OF MINORITY & WOMEN BUS. DEV., supra note 108.  
112
 See, e.g., CAL. UNIFIED CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, DISADVANTAGED 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (DBE) CERTIFICATION APPLICATION 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.caltrans.ca.gov/hq/bep/downloads/pdf/DBE_Application.pdf.;  
DIV. OF MINORITY & WOMEN BUS. DEV., EMPIRE STATE DEV., NEW YORK STATE 
MWBE CERTIFICATION SUPPLEMENTAL APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT 4 (2012), 
available at 
http://www.esd.ny.gov/MWBE/Data/Application/MWBE_Fast_Track_ForEII.pdf.    
113
 See, e.g., CAL. UNIFIED CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 17.  
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claim about being subject to ethnic prejudice or ethnic bias or suffer-
ing the effects of discrimination.
114
 
The social disadvantage certification presumption raises two 
narrow tailoring issues: (1) whether the affidavit language on its face 
meets the standards courts have set for remediable action in contract-
ing and (2) whether these affidavits distinguish between those particu-
lar business-owners who have actually suffered from the kind of dis-
crimination properly remedied by a preferential contracting program 
and those making inappropriate claims.  
For persons identified with the designated racial, ethnic, and 
gender groups, the presumption of being socially disadvantaged exists 
in all preferential contracting programs. However, what does “identi-
fied” mean in a country that has an increasing number of mixed race 
and ethnic persons who have multiple or weak identifications with any 
group? SBA regulations define the concept of identification as fol-
lows: “An individual must demonstrate that he or she has held himself 
or herself out, and is currently identified by others, as a member of a 
designated group if SBA requires it.”115 Except for some groups such 
as Native American tribes, however, no concept of “official” racial or 
ethnic member of a designated group exists. In reality, group identifi-
cation for the SBA and USDOT recipients is established by checking 
one of these boxes on the application form.
116
 
Group identification is only the first step for an owner seeking 
certification for a business. Since it might be thought that granting 
public contracting preferences to any person identified with designated 
racial, ethnic, and gender groups is not a narrowly tailored remedy, the 
regulations also require the owner applying for certification to be “so-
cially and economically disadvantaged.”117 Persons so identified with 
the designated groups, however, are “presumed” to be socially and 
economically disadvantaged. This presumption, in theory, can be chal-
lenged. The SBA regulations state: “The presumption of social disad-
vantage may be overcome with credible evidence to the contrary. Indi-
viduals possessing or knowing of such evidence should submit the 
information in writing to the Associate Administrator for Business 
Development (“AA/BD”) for consideration.”118 
                                                          
114
 See generally id. (omitting any indication that the applicant must provide 
proof of being subject to ethnic prejudice or ethnic bias or suffering the effects of 
discrimination). 
115
 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b)(2) (2012). 
116
 George R. La Noue & John C. Sullivan, supra 99, at 149–50. 
117
 13 C.F.R. § 124.101 (2012). 
118
 Id. § 124.103(b)(3) (2012). 
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USDOT recipients are also required to follow a procedure for 
challenges.
119
 The regulations state nine procedural steps for such a 
challenge (e.g., the complaint must be in writing, recipients must pro-
vide written notice to firms deemed ineligible, must provide opportuni-
ty for a hearing, etc.)
120
 
On the surface then, the rebuttable process looks like a well-
articulated administrative procedure that might contribute to narrow 
tailoring. Nevertheless, some judges have been skeptical about wheth-
er the presumption can in fact be challenged. Federal Court of Appeals 
Judge Richard Posner noted, “The presumption can be rebutted, but 
given the difficulty of establishing whether a particular individual is 
socially and economically disadvantaged the availability of the disad-
vantage is likely to be decisive.”121 Was Posner right about the possi-
bility of rebuttal? In defining the substantive standards for a challenge, 
the regulations essentially repeat the criteria used in the social disad-
vantage affidavit described in Part III of this Article.
122
  The only sub-
stantive difference is that in addition to the language “socially disad-
vantaged individuals” the phrase “disability” has been added.123 
There is one huge omission, however. The regulations do not 
address the circumstance when an individual’s life experiences might 
mean that they have outgrown the socially disadvantaged designa-
tion.
124
 All owners seeking certification need to do is swear that at one 
time in their life they were subjected to group-based prejudice or bias.  
 
C. The Case of Marco Rubio 
 
To illustrate this issue, consider the career of Marco Rubio (R. 
Fla.). Mr. Rubio was born in Miami to parents of Cuban exiles
125
 and, 
                                                          
119
 See 49 C.F.R. § 26.87 (2012). 
120
 Id.  
121
 Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers Ass’n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
122
 See 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. E (2012). 
123
 See id. The regulations state that the Department is aware that “people with 
disabilities have disproportionately low incomes and high rates of unemployment . . . 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed in recognition of the dis-
crimination faced by people with disabilities.” Id. § 26 App. E(II) (2012). 
124
 See 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. E (2012) (omitting any reference to procedures re-
garding when an individual might outgrow the socially disadvantaged designation). 
125
 About Marco, MARCO RUBIO: U.S. SENATOR FOR FLA., 
http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/biography (last visited Sept. 27, 
2012), 
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thus, is clearly identified as Hispanic.
126
 In Miami, however, there is 
some question as to whether the Cuban-American community is dis-
advantaged as a whole.
127
 But what about Mr. Rubio as an individual? 
Is he currently socially disadvantaged? 
He graduated from the University of Florida and then received 
his J.D. from the University of Miami in 1996.
128
 Did his educational 
achievement make him no longer “socially disadvantaged”? Mr. Rubio 
served as a City Commissioner for West Miami and was then elected 
to the Florida House of Representatives in 1999.
129
 In 2006, Mr. Rubio 
was elected Speaker of the Florida House,
130
 indicating his acceptabil-
ity on a statewide basis far beyond Cuban-American neighborhoods. 
Three years later, he began his campaign for the United States Senate, 
first toppling incumbent Governor Charlie Crist in the Republican 
primary and then beating his Democratic opponent in the general elec-
tion.
131
 Currently, he serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee and is the ranking member on one of its subcommittees.
132
 Would 
any of his political accomplishments render Mr. Rubio no longer “so-
cially disadvantaged” and, if so, which ones? 
Suppose Mr. Rubio had purchased a business and had sought 
certification for that business in the DBE or 8(a) programs as a “social-
ly disadvantaged” owner.  Even though Mr. Rubio’s success is well-
known, could anyone successfully rebut his claim to be socially disad-
vantaged and at what stage of his meteoric career could such a chal-
lenge be effective? The answer is probably no one, because, although 
the process for such a challenge exists in the regulations, the criteria 
do not. The regulations do not identify particular achievements 
                                                          
126
 Roughly fifteen percent of Hispanics in the United States now marry cauca-
sians, Zhenchao Qian & Daniel T. Lichter, Changing Patterns of Interracial Mar-
riage in a Multiracial Society, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 1065, 1073 (2011), but the 
regulations only require that the certification applicant identify with a presumptively 
disadvantaged group. 
127
 For an explanation of what is often called the Cuban-American economic 
miracle in Miami, see generally MIGUEL GONZALEZ-PANDO, THE CUBAN-
AMERICANS 117–40 (1998).   
128
 Marco Rubio – Biography, REPUBLICAN BUS. COUNCIL, 
 http://www.republicanbusinesscouncil.com/bios/rubio_bio.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 
2012).  
129
 Marco Rubio, BIO. TRUE STORY, www.biography.com/people/marco-rubio-
20840041 (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
130
 Id. 
131
 Id. 
132
 Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. SENATE 
http://www.senate.gov/general/committee_membership/committee_memberships_SS
FR.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
La Noue 2/18/2013  7:23 PM 
2012] SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE 299 
through which a person identified with the designated groups could 
emerge from a “socially disadvantaged” status. Therefore, if birth de-
termines whether a person is forever “socially disadvantaged,” and 
there is no practical way for that status to change or be challenged, 
then the presumption will not yield narrowly tailored results. 
Since the criteria do not exist by which a challenger might as-
sert that a particular owner was not actually socially disadvantaged, 
there would be no clear basis for such a challenge. What Judge Posner 
suspected can be demonstrated empirically. Freedom of Information 
Act (“FOIA”) requests to SBA and the Maryland Department of 
Transportation disclose that no challenges were made concerning the 
“social disadvantage” status of any of the roughly 9,000 8(a) firms or 
6,000 DBE firms in Maryland between January 2003 and October 
2011.
133
 Of course, the fact that Maryland DOT has had no complaints 
in eight years
134
 does not eliminate the possibility that there has been 
such activity in other states. Without articulated criteria for determin-
ing when someone is no longer socially disadvantaged, however, such 
complaints are unlikely.   
If it is the case that as a practical matter the status of being “so-
cially disadvantaged” is a permanent status when a person is identified 
with one of the designated racial, ethnic, or gender groups and that no 
person can challenge that disadvantaged status designation by showing 
an owner’s individual achievement, then the presumption challenge 
process does little to narrowly tailor the certification process. 
 
D. Certification for Individuals without a Designated 
 Group Identification 
 
During the post-Adarand debate on the future of the DBE pro-
gram, proponents emphasized that persons who were not identified 
with designated groups could become certified DBEs as evidence that 
the program really was narrowly tailored.
135
 Like the claim that the so-
cial disadvantage presumption can be rebutted, the claims about non-
designated group owner participation as DBEs do not describe the way 
the program really works. The regulations state that an applicant seek-
                                                          
133
 Emails from Joan Elliston, Program Analyst, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., to 
author and Zenita Wickham Hurley, Director, Office of Md. MBE (Sept. 23, 2011) 
(on file with author).  
134
 Id. 
135
 Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of 
Transportation Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 5096, 5099 (Feb. 2, 1999). 
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ing DBE status as an individual rather than as a member of a designat-
ed group must have:  
 
A. At least one objective distinguishing feature that has 
contributed to social disadvantage, such as race, ethnic 
origin, gender, disability, long term residence in an en-
vironment isolated from the mainstream of American 
society, or other similar causes not common to individ-
uals who are not socially disadvantaged.  
B. Personal experiences of substantial and chronic social 
disadvantage in American society.
136
   
    
 The key language, however, is that certifying recipients will 
consider evidence about various forms of discrimination in education, 
employment, and business history “to see if the totality of circum-
stances shows disadvantage in entering into or advancing in the busi-
ness world.”137 In contrast, neither any sort of evidence of substantial 
and chronic disadvantage nor an evaluation of totality of circumstanc-
es are required to award certification to persons identified with the 
designated groups.
138
 As a consequence, except for a few disabled per-
sons, there are very few owners who are certified DBEs who are not 
members of designated groups.  In a 2004 study of Federal Aviation 
Administration awards across the country, DBEs not affiliated with a 
designated group received only 3% of DBE contracts and less than 1% 
of these dollars.
139
  
 
V. EVIDENCE FROM DISPARITY STUDIES  
 
 After rejecting the various forms of evidence Richmond relied 
upon to support its MBE program, Justice O’Connor offered a formula 
in her Croson opinion for beginning the process of establishing proof 
of discrimination. She argued, “Where there is a significant statistical 
disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing 
and able to perform a particular service and the number of such con-
tractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contrac-
                                                          
136
 49 C.F.R. § 26, App. E(I) (2012). 
137
 Id. § 26, App. E(I)(C) (emphasis added).  
138
 See id. § 26 App. E(I). 
139
 George R. La Noue, Follow the Money: Who Benefits From the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s DBE Program?, supra note 98, at 494. 
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tors, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise.”140  
A lesson many jurisdictions took from this Croson language 
was that to maintain or establish an MWBE program, they needed to 
commission a disparity study. About 350 of these studies have been 
completed at a cost of at least $140 million.
141
 These studies examine 
whether there are significant statistical disparities in the availability 
and utilization of MWBEs compared to non-MWBEs in the award of 
government contracts.
142
 The crucial issue is whether availability is 
measured according to Croson’s standards of comparing the number of 
qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform special ser-
vices with the number actually retained. Often, that standard has not 
been met.
143
 
Even if a valid statistical disparity were found, Croson states it 
would only create an inference of discrimination,
144
 so most studies al-
so engage in anecdotal research as an attempt to understand whether a 
discriminatory context exists that would explain the found dispari-
ties.
145
  Typically, the disparity consultant will form focus groups or 
conduct phone or mail surveys to ask questions about respondent expe-
                                                          
140
 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) (plurality 
opinion).  
141
 The Project on Civil Rights and Public Contracts collection of disparity 
studies in the Albin O. Kuhn library at the University of Maryland Baltimore County 
houses 280 such studies. 
142
 See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH  ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- 
AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK 381 
(2010). 
143
 Croson, 488 U.S. at 501–02 (“[W]here special qualifications are necessary, 
the relevant statistical pool for the purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclu-
sion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.)”. 
The Croson Court then criticized Richmond because it had no data regarding “how 
many MBE’s in the relevant market are qualified to undertake prime or subcontract-
ing work in public construction projects.” Id. at 502.  Various circuit courts have 
emphasized the necessity of measuring qualifications and firm capacity. See 
O’Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 426 (D.C. Cir. 
1992); Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. v. Metro. Dade Cnty. 122 F.3d 895, 920–
21 (11th. Cir. 1997); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 
730, 736 (6th Cir. 2000); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 545 F.3d 1023, 1045 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
144
 Croson, 488 U.S. at 509. 
145
 On the other hand, anecdotes alone are generally not considered to be a suf-
ficient predicate for a preferential contracting program. “While anecdotal evidence 
may suffice to prove individual claims of discrimination, rarely, if ever, can such ev-
idence show a systemic pattern of discrimination necessary for the adoption of an 
affirmative action plan…[T]he MBE program cannot stand without a proper statisti-
cal foundation.” Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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riences with discrimination.
146
 Generally, these results will be reported 
in snippets of quotes or paraphrases without attribution to any person 
or firm.
147
 Often these anecdotes will reflect complaints of societal 
discrimination,
148
 which Croson and other court decisions have found 
are not enough to support race-based decisions. Some of these anec-
dotes, if true, will reflect incidents of discrimination, which would re-
quire individual remedies. A few reflect more generalized problems 
that might fit Croson’s standard of an extreme case of “patterns of de-
liberate exclusion.”149  
The anecdotal sections of disparity studies also have been sub-
jected to various criticisms.
150
 The major problem with disparity study 
anecdotal sections is that rarely is there a quantitative report on the 
frequency of alleged discriminatory incidents.
151
 For example, if a 
study reports one respondent has had a problem with a biased building 
inspector, the reader has no way to tell whether that is an isolated or 
endemic problem. Such anecdotes contribute little to understanding 
whether Croson’s “patterns of deliberate exclusion” exist and cannot 
contribute to evaluating whether the blanket presumption of social dis-
advantage in the certification process for members of some groups is 
narrowly tailored. 
Some disparity studies, however, do quantify their results from 
mail surveys.
152
 Though the evidence is not perfect (return rates are 
frequently low, and there is no verification about the truth of any alle-
gation), these studies provide some evidence about the perceptions mi-
nority and women owned business owners have about the extent of 
discrimination they face.
153
 
                                                          
146
 See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND (FINAL REPORT) 13 (2006).  
147
 See, e.g., id. at 226–32.  
148
 See, e.g., id. 
149
 Croson, 488 U.S at 509.  
150
 See Jeffrey M. Hanson, Note, Hanging by Yarns?: Deficiencies in Anecdo-
tal Evidence Threaten the Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs for Public 
Contracting, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1433, 1437 (2003) (arguing that state policy-
makers have not sufficiently scrutinized the anecdotal sections of disparity studies 
and subsequently have allowed narratives of actual discrimination to be underval-
ued); See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 78.  
151
 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Columbus, 936 F. Supp 
1363, 1413–15 (S.D. Ohio 1996), vacated on other grounds 172 F.3d 411 (1999). 
152
 See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, supra note 146, at 218–26.  
153
 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 936 F. Supp 1363 at 1415–
19, vacated on other grounds 172 F.3d 411 (1999). 
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Such evidence of minority and women’s perceptions of dis-
crimination has existed for at least two decades. In 1990, the Minneso-
ta Center for Survey Research published the results of a survey of 
about 700 minority and women business owners within that state.
154
 In 
answer to the question of whether you believe “your business has been 
hampered by discrimination against you as a minority or female,” 
about two-thirds of the respondents said no.
155
 Since roughly two-
thirds of the owners had participated in a “purchasing preference or a 
set-aside program” for MWBEs and approximately two-thirds had 
been awarded contracts or purchases under these programs, it is likely 
most of the respondents were owners of certified businesses.
156
 Of 
those claiming to have experienced an instance of discrimination, less 
than 10% filed any sort of complaint.
157
 In a more recent disparity 
study for the City of Milwaukee, 7.1% and 3.9% of firm owners who 
did business with the city claimed they had suffered discrimination be-
cause of race/ethnicity or gender by that government, respectively.
158
  
The National Economic Research Associates (“NERA”) is one 
of the largest producers of disparity studies.
159
 Most of their studies 
survey MWBEs about their experience with various forms of discrimi-
nation or barriers to business formation.
160
 Some NERA studies thus 
permit an examination of whether DBEs/MWBEs believe they have 
been discriminated against in their application for credit. They would 
need to affirm in the certification process that “my ability to compete 
in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capi-
tal and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same or simi-
lar line of business.”161  Figure A displays the answer to the question 
about commercial loan credit from a wide variety of jurisdictions.  
 
 
                                                          
154
 MINN. DEP’T. OF ADMIN., A STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN- 
AND MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES AND OF OTHER SMALL-BUSINESS TOPICS 47 
(1990).  
155
 See id. at 51.  
156
 See id. at 52. 
157
 Id. at 49. 
158
 D. WILSON CONSULTING GROUP, DISPARITY STUDY FOR THE CITY OF 
MILWAUKEE 9-45 (2010). 
159
 MBW/WBE/DBE Availability and Disparity Studies, NERA.COM, 
http://wwwnera.com/59-2147.htm   (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
160
 See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, supra note 146, at 236 
(highlighting the different areas where various firms have indicated that they have 
been treated less favorably due to race). 
161
 See, e.g., 13 C.F.R. § 127.203 (2012). 
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Figure A
162
 
Percentage of Firms Indicating They Had Been Treated Less  
Favorably Due to Race and/or Gender in Applying for  
Commercial Loans 
 
Study African 
American 
Hispanic Asian 
American 
Native 
American 
Women MWBE/DBE 
Average 
State of MD  
(2011) 
43.1 21.7 32.2 38.9 9.5 25.1 
State of MD  
(2006) 
49.2 39.5 19.6 22.2 18.5 31.5 
Augusta, GA  
(2009) 
47.1 0.0 30.0 5.9 9.4 26.2 
Memphis, TN (2008) 41.7 33.3 37.5 37.5 18.4 32.9 
State of UT  
(2009) 
25.0 13.6 20.0 30.0 9.4 12.5 
Northeast Ohio, OH 
(2010) 
45.0 11.1 0.0 20.0 13.5 19.0 
Austin, TX  
(2008) 
47.8 23.8 0.0 14.3 8.3 16.5 
State of NY  
(2010) 
37.5 19.6 15.8 0.0 13.0 19.2 
Broward Co., FL 
(2010) 
47.4 16.9 22.2 0.0 11.6 20.2 
Minneapolis, MN  
(2010) 
40.0 20.0 29.4 11.1 12.4 17.0 
 
                                                          
162
 NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, supra note 146, at 236; NAT’L ECON. 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
THE CITY OF AUSTIN 249 (2008); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RACE, SEX, 
AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 272 (2009); NAT’L 
ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK 381 (2010); NAT’L ECON. 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM BROWARD COUNTY 343 (2010); NAT’L ECON. 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MINNEAPOLIS 246 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH 
ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MARYLAND 491 (2011); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH 
ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM NORTHEAST OHIO 310 (2010); NAT’L ECON. 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 276 (2008); NAT’L ECON. 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM STATE OF UTAH 309 (2009). 
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As Figure A shows, while responses vary in different jurisdic-
tions and among different groups, there is a discernible pattern. Afri-
can-Americans owners are most likely to believe they have been treat-
ed less favorably in seeking credit, while white women are least likely 
to share that sentiment. In no group does even a majority claim unfa-
vorable treatment in seeking credit. 
The social disadvantage certification process, however, asks 
for affirmation of a much broader claim than does the economic certi-
fication requirement. It asks whether respondents have “been subjected 
to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within American Society 
because of their identities as members of [minority] groups, and with-
out regard to their individual qualities.”163 No disparity study in its an-
ecdotal section has asked a question that broadly, but NERA studies do 
ask respondents whether they believe they had been “treated less fa-
vorably due to race and/or sex while participating in business deal-
ings,” in fourteen different business categories.164 Respondents were 
asked to check “yes” or “no” in a box for each category.165 It would 
have been instructive if the NERA studies had followed up on their 
surveys to find out more about what incidents persons were referring 
to when they believed they were subjected to discrimination. While 
some of the percentages are disturbingly high, no further information 
about the character of the incident is available. The aggregated results 
from recent NERA studies can be seen below.
166
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
163
 P.R. DEP’T TRANP., CERTIFICATION OF SOCIAL & ECONOMIC 
DISADVANTAGE: PERSONAL NET WORTH 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.dtop.gov.pr/pdf/det_social_disadvantage.pdf.  
164
 See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, supra note 146, at 236. 
165
 See id. 
166
 Research on the NERA studies in Figure A and B was conducted by John 
C. Sullivan, Associate Director of the Project on Civil Rights and Public Contracts, 
July 2011. 
La Noue 2/18/2013  7:23 PM 
306 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL 12:2 
Figure B
167
 
NERA Disparity Studies Asking About Various Forms of Business 
Discrimination 
 
Jurisdiction Percentage of Minority 
Respondents NOT Claim-
ing Discrimination in 
Business Dealings 
Percentage of White Women 
NOT Claiming Discrimination 
in Business Dealings 
State of MD  
(2006) 
42.5% 61.2% 
Austin, TX 
(2008) 
50.5% 64.5% 
Memphis, TN 
(2008) 
35.2% 50.8% 
State of UT 
(2009) 
52.6% 64.4% 
Augusta, GA 
(2009) 
49.6% 70.1% 
State of NY 
(2010) 
51.0% 62.5% 
Northeast Ohio, OH 
(2010) 
46.3% 67.9% 
Broward County, FL 
(2010) 
56.8% 72.7% 
Minneapolis, MN 
(2010) 
40.6% 61.9% 
State of MD  
(2011) 
46.7% 69.1% 
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 NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., supra note 146, at 236 (2006);  
NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE CITY OF AUSTIN 249 (2008); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH 
ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 272 (2009); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE 
STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
NEW YORK 381 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE STATE OF 
MINORITY- AND WOMAN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
BROWARD COUNTY 343 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE 
STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
MINNEAPOLIS 246 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE STATE 
OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
MARYLAND 491 (2011); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF 
MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
NORTHEAST OHIO 310 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF 
MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 276 (2008); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE 
OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM STATE 
OF UTAH 307 (2009). 
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As Figure B shows, across many different NERA studies in 
different parts of the country, there was a roughly similar pattern in re-
spondent answers. About three-fifths of women business owners and 
two-fifths of minority business owners did not claim they had suffered 
from discrimination in any form of business dealings. It cannot be de-
termined how many of these business owners NERA surveyed had 
signed the certification affidavit claiming they had suffered from racial 
prejudice, cultural bias, or discrimination. The NERA sample, howev-
er, was confined to owners who indicated their firms had worked or 
attempted to work in the public sector in the last five years, so it would 
have made sense for many of these firms to seek certification. Plausi-
bly, certified firms would be overrepresented in disparity study anec-
dotal sections, since they would have the most interest in continuing 
MWBE programs,
168
 but one cannot be sure about the proportions of 
certified and non-certified firms in any of the NERA samples. 
Who most often reports discrimination tends to vary not only 
by the group identification but also by the type of business involved. 
Figure C illustrates responses of 4,500 Texas MWBEs or Historically 
Underutilized Businesses  (“HUBs”), as they are called in that state, to 
a very broad question asking if they had experienced at least one in-
stance of any sort of discrimination in the last five years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
168
 In Engineering Contractors Ass’n of S. Florida v. Metro. Dade Cnty., for 
example, the trial court expressed doubt about whether self interest might taint anec-
dotal reports. 943 F.Supp. 1546, 1579 (S.D.Fla. 1996). “. . . [I]ndividuals who have a 
vested interest in preserving a benefit or entitlement may be motivated to view 
events in a manner that justifies the entitlement.” Id. “Consequently, it is important 
that both sides are heard and that there are other measures of the accuracy of the 
claims. Attempts to investigate and verify the anecdotal evidence should be made.” 
Id.  
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Figure C
169
 
Percentage of Texas Hubs in Specific Industries Who Report at 
Least One Instance of Discrimination in the Last Five Years 
 
 
Race/ Sex Group Construction Commodities Professional and 
Other Services 
Total Average 
African American 48.4 44.8 41.7 43.5 
Hispanic 35.2 19.6 24.1 24.1 
Asian 38.9 16.9 26.1 22.7 
Native American 27.6 24.4 19.1 22.7 
Total Minorities 38.5 26.4 29.7 29.6 
White Women 19.1 9.7 16.3 13.6 
Total Average HUBS 31.9 18.2 24.4 22.8 
 
 
As reported in Figure C, no majority of owners in any group 
claims to have suffered from discrimination, though there are some 
clear patterns. Again, African-Americans are most likely to claim dis-
crimination and white women are the least likely to do so. Discrimina-
tion is more often claimed by firm owners in the construction industry 
than by businesses in commodities and professional or other services.      
In a few studies, NERA found some groups of MWBE busi-
ness owners claimed to have experienced less business discrimination 
than non-MWBEs, but that was not the common pattern.
170
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
169
 NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., STATE OF TEXAS DISPARITY 
STUDY, xxiv (1994), available at http://hub.tamus.edu/Documents/Disparity%20 
Study.pdf.  
170
 See NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM THE CITY OF AUSTIN 249 (2008); NAT’L ECON. 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE 
FROM AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 272 (2009); THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMEN-
OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM NORTHEAST OHIO 310 (2010). 
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Figure D
171
 
Disparity Studies Where Some Minorities Claimed Less  
Discrimination in Any Business Dealings than White Males 
 
STUDY GROUP PERCENTAGE OF 
MINORITY GROUP 
RESPONDENTS  
CLAIMING 
DISCRIMINATION 
PERCENTAGE OF 
WHITE MALES 
CLAIMING 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
Austin, TX  
(2008) 
NATIVE 
AMERICAN 
31.0% 
 
32.7% 
 
Memphis, TN 
(2008) 
HISPANIC 20.0% 
 
26.2% 
 
Augusta, GA 
(2009) 
NATIVE 
AMERICAN 
20.0% 
 
26.1% 
 
Northeast, OH 
(2010) 
ASIAN 21.4% 
 
26.6% 
 
 
In both the NERA and the other disparity studies discussed 
here, certified and non-certified firms were included in their samples. 
However, a disparity study for Fulton County, Georgia in metropolitan 
Atlanta, conducted by Thomas Boston, an economics professor at The 
Georgia Institute of Technology, surveyed only certified MWBEs to 
obtain anecdotes.
172
 Of 73 respondents, only 16% believed they had 
encountered discrimination by Fulton County in the past and only 12% 
believed such discrimination was still continuing.
173
 On the other 
hand, 52% felt that they had encountered discrimination in seeking fi-
nancing and credits; 20% agreed they had encountered bonding dis-
crimination; and 53% agreed that they had been discriminated against 
by majority-owned firms in the past.
174
     
 
                                                          
171
 NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM THE CITY OF AUSTIN 249 (2008); NAT’L ECON. 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE 
FROM AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 272 (2009); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., 
THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE 
FROM NORTHEAST OHIO 310 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE 
STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM 
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 276 (2008). 
172
 Webster v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (N.D.Ga. 1999). 
173
 Id. at 1379.   
174
 Id. When a federal district court reviewed the statistical and anecdotal evi-
dence in the studies Fulton County relied on, , it found the county’s MFBE program 
did not have a compelling interest. Id. at 1382.  
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In short, in a variety of disparity studies completed by different 
consultants in different parts of the country at different times, when 
MWBEs were asked whether they believe they had experienced dis-
crimination or unfavorable treatment because of their race, ethnicity, 
or gender, respondents were quite mixed in their responses. Taken to-
gether, the evidence from disparity studies support a conclusion that 
many MWBEs believe business discrimination exists. On the other 
hand, the studies show most MWBEs do not perceive such discrimina-
tion. A widespread perception of contracting discrimination is cause 
for concern, even if not all perceptions are accurate.  The disparity 
study reports, however, also do not support the blanket presumption 
that all minority and women-owned businesses should be considered 
socially disadvantaged in the certification process because they experi-
enced discrimination.  
 
VI. EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF MARYLAND MWBE CERTIFIED 
FIRMS  
 
When a firm owner signs the affidavit claiming “social disad-
vantage” in order to gain DBE or MWBE certification, what is that 
person’s understanding of that concept? When the owner claims to 
have suffered from discrimination, what kind of incidents does the 
owner have in mind? Those questions have not been previously stud-
ied. Are those concepts and incidents consistent with the standard of 
narrow tailoring on which a race and gender-conscious contracting 
program could be constitutionally based? Maryland uses the Uniform 
Certification process,
175
 so the process to become a certified DBE for 
federal contracts and for state MWBE contract is the same. Does the 
certification process affidavit clearly weed out owners entitled to some 
remedy from those who are not? A survey of certified Maryland 
MWBEs provides very preliminary answers to these questions. 
In a February 2011 NERA statewide disparity study conducted 
for the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”), 46.7% of 
minority respondents and 69.1% of white women respondents did not 
claim they had encountered discrimination in their business deal-
ings.
176
 The survey included certified and uncertified firms, and the re-
sults are generally consistent with the pattern NERA found in its stud-
ies nationwide. 
                                                          
175
 MD. CODE REGS. 11.01.10.01 (2012). 
176
 NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND 
WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MARYLAND 491 (2011). 
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So what would be found if only certified Maryland MWBE 
firms were asked about their concept of social disadvantage and their 
experiences of discrimination? In June 2011, Maryland had certified 
5,303 DBEs and MWBEs.
177
 From that list, twenty firms were chosen 
for a telephone survey by using a systematic sample. Some owners 
could not be reached at all, and sometimes the person filling out the 
certification affidavit was not available. In those instances, the next 
tenth firm on the certification list was used as a replacement to main-
tain the quality of the survey. In the end, of the twenty firms surveyed, 
twelve were African American, three were Hispanic American, one 
was an Asian American, and four were “non-minority” females.  
Respondents gave a variety of answers about why they were 
socially disadvantaged: 
 
 I don’t have equal share of the contracts that are being 
awarded by the government. 
 
 Not being able to achieve or get what you want be-
cause of your sex. 
 
 Not getting what you deserve or want due to certain 
reasons having to do with your race. 
 
Being denied things because of your social conditions, 
race or sex. 
 
 Not having access to the same opportunity. 
 
 Not getting an equal share or opportunity to bid for 
contracts. 
 
 Being a minority, and having low income. 
 
 Not having equal share of government contracts. 
 
 Being confronted with the perception that people of 
your race cannot perform in the business world. 
                                                          
177
 Theodore Ogune & George La Noue, A Survey of Maryland MWBE Certi-
fied Firms (December 16, 2012) (unpublished study) (on filed with the author). This 
particular section of research was conducted by Theodore Ogune, a lawyer and doc-
toral student in Public Policy at UMBC. 
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 Not being treated fairly by the government because 
you are African-American. 
 
 Being deprived of rights and opportunities. 
 
 The stereotype someone has to live within the busi-
ness world because of race. 
 
 Being discriminated against in the business world, 
where your business is put aside or ignored because of 
your race. 
 
 Being denied things that should be free and equal for 
all. 
 
 Being a woman and being Black in this world. 
 
 Not receiving equal treatment and benefits from the 
government. 
 
 The advantages from which you are naturally ruled 
out because of your race.   
 
When asked in follow-up questions about particular experienc-
es of past discrimination, sixteen, or 80%, reported having individual 
experiences of past discrimination in the business world at some point 
in their life. When asked to describe specific incidents of this discrimi-
nation, however, many examples appeared to be generalized assertions 
of “societal discrimination.”  
For example, respondents reported: 
 
 “I don’t have specifics, but we can always see that a 
lot of contracts from the county and state go to the large 
companies that are usually run by the white corporate 
world. So being black and a female always put me in 
the back seat.” 
 
“I have a white friend who basically would not be 
searched when we went out together, but I would usual-
ly be searched to the fullest.” 
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“I have no specific examples but I have filed a com-
plaint about discrimination in the past.” 
 
“I have faced racism on several occasions in business 
but I could not prove it.”  
 
“I applied for a job in the past and did not receive it 
because of my race.  I believed it was because of race 
because the person that I found out later got the job was 
white and was not more qualified than me.” 
 
“I won’t even speak of the horrifying experiences, but 
what I would say is that I have experienced racism in 
the country, and racism is still in full force depending 
on where you find yourself.” 
 
“I interviewed for a job that I believe I did not get be-
cause of my race.” 
 
“At a restaurant in Texas when I went for a trip, the 
white waiter was rude and very obnoxious towards me, 
when I asked him the reason for his behavior he called 
me a derogatory name.” 
 
Only two of the illustrations of discrimination were related to 
specific contracting occurrences. 
 
 “I once applied for a contract and, for reasons that I 
could not understand, did not get the contract, even 
though I had the same qualifications as the one who re-
ceived the contract.” 
 
 
 “Back in 2004, I applied for a contract with the gov-
ernment along with my Caucasian friend, but, for some 
reason, she received the contract before I was even con-
sidered, and I was generally better than her credential-
wise. That left me to believe I was discriminated 
against at least in that situation.” 
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Not surprisingly, the certified MWBEs in this Maryland survey 
had a variety of interpretations of the meaning of social disadvantage 
and of the concept of discrimination itself. 
According to contemporary judicial standards, a few of their 
reports of discriminatory incidents might call for contracting remedies, 
but most others focused on employment or other forms of discrimina-
tion for which an MWBE goals program is not a narrowly-tailored 
remedy. Still other examples appear to be in the category of societal 
discrimination which courts have ruled out as a compelling interest for 
a remedial program.   
A sample of twenty Maryland MWBEs cannot prove anything 
about flaws in the certification process, but it is enough to establish a 
hypothesis that the social disadvantage prong of that process is not 
narrowly tailored. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The Court’s Croson decision converted the process of justify-
ing preferential contracting programs from a matter of ideological 
conviction or stereotypes to a matter of empirical proof. As Justice 
O’Connor said, “proper findings” have to be made to “assure all citi-
zens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial 
and economic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the 
service of the goal of equality itself.”178  
The DBE and MWBE certification processes begin by presum-
ing that all minority and women business owners are socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged. Access to the business records used in the 
economic disadvantage section of the certification process, particularly 
those used to establish the applicant’s assertion about his or her com-
parative disadvantage with competitor firms, could permit a third party 
to rebut that assertion. There is no meaningful way, however, to rebut 
this presumption regarding particular applicants. Surely there is still 
some discrimination in public procurement and some male majority-
owned prime-contractors may choose to contract with sub-contractors 
who look like them or belong to the same social clubs, even if other 
sub-contractors offer lower prices or are more qualified. But that is a 
long way from assuming such discriminatory behavior affects all mi-
nority and women-owned businesses, is perpetrated by all majority 
                                                          
178
 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
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primes or that all MWBEs and DBEs are permanently damaged be-
cause of some past discriminatory incident.  
The major reason for the current certification process is proba-
bly administrative convenience. The social disadvantage affidavit’s 
use of terms such as racial prejudice and cultural bias to justify con-
tracting preferences are not narrowly tailored according to Croson.
179
 
For the bureaucrats that administer the certification process, however, 
the affidavit process is enormously efficient. The affidavit is a single 
sentence, and does not need to be verified.
180
 The economic disad-
vantage form, however, is ten pages, must be accompanied by support-
ing documents, and is sometimes carefully examined by certification 
administrators.
181
  
As Croson concluded, administrative convenience is not a suf-
ficient reason to avoid narrowly-tailoring a preferential contracting 
program.
182
 The Court rejected Richmond’s “interest in avoiding the 
bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who tru-
ly have suffered the effects of prior discrimination.”183  
Nevertheless, administrative convenience has dominated both 
the conceptual characteristics and the application procedures of the 
DBE and MWBE certification process. The list of minority groups un-
der the presumption of disadvantage, and the definitions of social and 
economic disadvantage, were borrowed by other government agencies 
from the SBA and codified in the 1978 Small Business Investment Act 
(“SBIA”).184 Despite the fact that the SBIA was passed many years be-
fore Croson, Adarand, and other court decisions set new standards for 
race conscious remedies, these 1970s SBA concepts have never been 
bureaucratically reviewed to examine their contemporary legality.   
Key phrases such as “racial prejudice” and “cultural bias,” as 
the Ninth Circuit recognized, may reflect only a claim of “societal dis-
crimination,”185 which is not a proper predicate for allocating govern-
                                                          
179
 See 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. F (2012); Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. 
180
 See 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. F (2012).  
181
 See id. The process of confirming the status of firms claiming economic 
disadvantage includes an office visit and interviews with the principal officers of the 
firms to review their career histories. If the firm is a corporation, an analysis of  who 
owns the stock is completed.  Analysis of the bonding and financial capacity, equip-
ment owned, licenses held, key personnel,  and work history of the firm is required. 
Id. § 26.83 (2012).   
182
 Croson, 488 U.S. at 508. 
183
 Id. 
184
  BEAN, supra note 33, at 102.  
185
 W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 1002 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
La Noue 2/18/2013  7:23 PM 
316 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL 12:2 
ment contracts on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender.
186
  These 
phrases are subject to a wide variety of personal interpretation. Fur-
thermore, it is also flawed to certify a business because the owner has 
expressed that “my ability to compete in the free enterprise system has 
been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as 
compared to others in the same or similar line of business who are not 
socially and economically disadvantaged.”187 Such an opinion may al-
so reflect societal discrimination. It is not tied to any time or place, and 
no proof is necessary. Creating race conscious remedies based on a 
person’s generalized beliefs about the discriminatory workings of the 
free enterprise system, capital, and credit markets without documenta-
tion of its effects on an individual is a judicially unprecedented predi-
cate for a race conscious remedy.   
The social disadvantage presumption eliminates individualized 
consideration of the characteristics or experiences of particular appli-
cants. In summarizing the debate about the use of the social disad-
vantage presumption, USDOT concluded, “This presumption (i.e., a 
determination that it is not necessary for group members to prove indi-
vidually that they have been the subject of discrimination or disad-
vantage) is based on the understanding of Members of Congress about 
the discrimination that members of these groups have faced.”188 Even 
if “understandings of Members of Congress” were a sufficient basis to 
grant the presumption to whole groups,
189
 the certification process re-
quires individual applicants to sign affidavits, under oath, that they 
have suffered racial prejudice, cultural bias, or discrimination--societal 
discrimination which is not a basis for a remedial contracting program, 
and thus may not be narrowly tailored. Furthermore, Congressional 
understandings would not be sufficient to support the use of this certi-
fication language by states, transit districts, sanitation districts, and 
school systems. 
                                                          
186
 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion); Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.  
187
 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. E (2012).  
188
 Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of 
Transportation Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 5096, 5099 (Feb. 2, 1999). On the other hand, 
Congress also determined that under the revised DBE program, each recipient would 
have the obligation to determine locally set goals which would create a level playing 
field and to maximize race neutral means to reach that goal, which is not consistent 
with a view that  Congress wanted to extend preferential contracting  benefits  to all 
members of the bureaucratically designated  racial, ethnic, and gender groups.  
189
 See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 413 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (holding that a race preferential contracting must be based on specific pre-
enactment evidence before Congress). 
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 USDOT cited no judicial decisions to support a group-based 
presumption as a basis for racial preferences because of generalized 
legislative beliefs. Such a concept was inconsistent with Croson then 
and also with more recent Court decisions about racial classifica-
tions.
190
 Even when the Court has accepted the limited use of race in 
allocating public benefits such as in college admissions, it has insisted 
there be individualized decisions about the beneficiaries.
191
  
How could the certification process become narrowly tailored? 
The first step would be to eliminate the “racial prejudice” and “cultural 
bias” language from the social disadvantage section of the application. 
These are concepts that are both under inclusive and over inclusive. 
Cultural bias in America is not exclusive to the designated minorities 
or women. Such bias might affect white male persons who are homo-
sexual, disabled, obese, smokers, or members of minority religions or 
minority ethnic groups such as Arabs or Iranians. On the other hand, a 
woman or member of the designated minority groups might have expe-
rienced cultural bias at some point in their lives, but have long since 
overcome its effects. The fact that the certification applicant has held a 
high political or governmental position, is on prominent business or 
community boards, or is a graduate of an elite university is irrelevant 
in the current certification process. Apparently, once born into the des-
ignated groups, no subsequent achievement can erase the presumption 
of social disadvantage. There is no comparable assumption in other ar-
eas of anti-discrimination enforcement. Where employment or housing 
is involved, for example, it is not enough to claim generalized preju-
                                                          
190
 See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003).   
191
 In Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court made the distinc-
tion between the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions process, which 
the Court found used race unconstitutionally, 539 U.S. at 275, and its law school 
admission process, because in the latter “each applicant is evaluated as an individual 
and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of 
his or her application.” 539 U.S. at 337. In major universities, such individualized 
admission decisions may involve reviewing tens of thousands of applications annual-
ly. But see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 (“But the fact that the implementation of a pro-
gram capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative 
challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”). Recip-
ients of federal funds already have procedures for making individualized, social dis-
advantage evaluations of applicants by considering education, employment, and 
business history, but they apply only to persons without the presumption. For per-
sons with the presumption, the social disadvantage decision is based simply on their 
racial, ethnic, and gender identification. See, e.g.,  49 C.F.R. § 26 App. F (2012). 
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dice or cultural bias--there must be some specific discriminatory inci-
dent involved. 
Similarly, the language about “diminished ability to compete in 
the free enterprise system” should be replaced with a request for evi-
dence that the applicant has actually experienced economic discrimina-
tion that has continued to affect the competitiveness of their business.  
For both the social and economic prongs, the certification pro-
cess should require information which would allow narrowly-tailored 
judgments to be reached about disadvantage. For instance, information 
should be requested about when and where the alleged incidents oc-
curred. Such information is not now required for those whose group 
membership makes them presumptively disadvantaged, though it is re-
quired for those lacking that membership. However, experiences of 
childhood discrimination 
192
 or bias may no longer be relevant to an 
owner’s current business situation.  While one state may not legally 
use contracting preferences to remedy discrimination allocating state 
dollars in its MWBE program to remedy discrimination in another 
state,
193
  MWBE certification processes generally do not require that 
any of the allegations of prejudice, bias or discrimination be confined 
to that state. MWBE certification forms are usually based on Uniform 
Certification forms which reflect the national DBE program.
194
 Infor-
mation should also be gathered about what benefits the applicant has 
already received. Many firms have been certified for decades and have 
received preferential contracts during the whole period.  Perpetual 
multi-jurisdictional contracting preferences should not be allowable as 
narrowly tailored remedies.  
 If the affidavit were limited to individually experienced dis-
crimination, courts should refine the definitions or boundaries for cer-
tification. Croson ruled that societal discrimination is not a basis for a 
remedial program because it has no “stopping point.”195 Since it is ex-
tremely unlikely that discrimination and cultural bias in some form 
will end in the United States, there is no logical end to DBE and 
MWBE programs either. 
                                                          
192
  See Croson, 488 U.S.  at 499 (rejecting the idea that discrimination in pri-
mary and secondary schools justifies medical school admission quotas). The current 
certification applications do not ask when an applicant feels he or she suffered from 
racial prejudice, cultural bias or discrimination. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. F 
(2012). 
193
 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490. 
194
 See, e.g. MD. CODE REGS. 11.01.10.01 (2012). 
195
 Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 
267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion)). 
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From Croson to all its many successor judicial decisions, courts have 
not found DBE or MWBE programs to be abstractly unconstitutional. 
They have, however, required them to have a compelling interest and 
to be narrowly tailored in operation. They have examined carefully 
many aspects of these programs, including the disparity studies and 
other evidence, the duration of the programs, the groups and industries 
covered, and the use of race neutral alternatives. However, the one 
program facet they have not subjected to strict scrutiny is the certifica-
tion process. Upon examination of the certification process, it is likely 
that courts will require modification of the economic and social disad-
vantage affidavit so that it not only focuses on persons entitled to a 
race or gender conscious remedy, but is also consistent with other ra-
cial and gender classification laws. 
